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(2015) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3).
Why, as responsible for figurativity, seeing-in can only be inflected seeing-in
Alberto Voltolini
pp. 651-667
In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim's well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation of the properties by which a certain subject is seen in a given picture as having refers to the design properties of the picture's vehicle, i.e., to the visible surface properties of that vehicle that are responsible for the fact that one such subject is seen in it, precisely taken in such a design role. Finally, I will try to show that seeing-in is qualified by inflection independently of whether it is conscious or unconscious (in the sense of subpersonal) seeing-in.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-013-9335-x
Full citation:
Voltolini, A. (2015). Why, as responsible for figurativity, seeing-in can only be inflected seeing-in. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3), pp. 651-667.
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