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Aristotle sternly rejects Platonic dualism, but nevertheless resists an ancient version of the identity theory of mind and body.¹ Equally dissatisfied with each of these alternatives, he endeavors to analyze the relationship between soul and body by employing the notions of form and matter introduced in the Physics and articulated and expanded in the Metaphysics (Meta.). Thus, in the De Anima (DA) we find the familiar claim that "the soul is a substance as form of a natural body having life in potentiality" (DS 412a19–22),² which Aristotle proceeds to illustrate by suggesting that the soul bears the same relation to the body as the shape of a candle does to its wax (DA 412b6–7). Both the claim and its illustration are in some ways obscure. But it is reasonably clear that these remarks represent Aristotle's attempt to provide a workable alternative to both Platonism and an austere form of the identity theory. Aristotle is perhaps the first philosopher to seek an account of mind-body relations which captures the insights of these theories while avoiding their individual shortcomings. Indeed, Aristotle self-consciously views his position in the philosophy of mind in much the same way contemporary functionalists view their own. Like the contemporary functionalist, Aristotle seeks a theory of the mental which avoids what he regards as the excesses of his predecessors: his preferred account would capture the supervenience of the mental on the physical without identifying mental state types with physical state types. Moreover, beyond having analogous historical vantage points, Aristotle and contemporary functionalists share deep theoretical commitments. So deep are these commitments that it is fair to regard Aristotle as the first functionalist.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-2161-0_2

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