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(1988) Perspectives on mind, Dordrecht, Springer.
Husserl and Fodor both accept a representational theory of mind (RTM). Both individuate mental states by their contents, which are provided by mental representations or noematic Sinn. Both adhere to methodological solipsism; mental states are theoretically isolated from environmental and social causes and effects. Their principled blindness to mind-world causal connections ally Husserl and Fodor in a common antipathy to "naturalistic psychology" which would insist that mental states cannot be identified without considering their causes and the contexts in which they occur.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_7
Full citation:
Emmett, K. (1988)., Meaning and mental representation, in H. Otto & J. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on mind, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 77-84.
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