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(2017) From conventionalism to social authenticity, Dordrecht, Springer.

Unobtrusive governance

Heidegger and Foucault on the sources of social normativity

Andreas Beinsteiner

pp. 79-97

Hubert Dreyfus uses social norms as the basic concept for appropriating Martin Heidegger's concept of the anyone. For Heidegger, however, social norms are rooted in a shared horizon of understanding – in what he later calls the clearing, or unconcealment, of being. Modes of understanding regulate individual and collective behaviour at a more fundamental level than the norms or conventions derived from this understanding. Therefore, in Heidegger, just like in Michel Foucault, a critique of the repression hypothesis can be found: The establishment of rules and norms by (explicit or implicit) threat of penalty is only one way among others – the most obvious way – of exercising power. Along these lines, the paper outlines an alternative to Dreyfus' interpretation of the relation between Heidegger's clearing and Foucault's power. Foucault conceives power as the structuring of the possible field of action of others, and in Heidegger individuals obtain their possibilities of thinking and action from the respective clearing of being. Therefore, the exercising of power can be interpreted as a structuring of this clearing. Human freedom, then, is not to be understood in terms of autonomy, but as the variability of the understanding of being. The anyone, in contrast, refers to an unquestioned and solidified understanding. After outlining these connections, the paper discusses two domains where the clearing of being is shaped: the design of equipment and public discourse.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-56865-2_5

Full citation:

Beinsteiner, A. (2017)., Unobtrusive governance: Heidegger and Foucault on the sources of social normativity, in H. B. Schmid & G. Thonhauser (eds.), From conventionalism to social authenticity, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 79-97.

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