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(2018) Rationality in the social sciences, Dordrecht, Springer.

An approach to the analysis of the role of rationality in social action

Talcott Parsons

Edited by Helmut Staubmann, Victor Lidz

pp. 53-57

The paper approaches the problem of rationality on the basis of the theory of action elaborated in Parsons " The Structure of Social Action of 1937. The voluntaristic action frame of reference, as it was called, implies the opportunity of choice in the course of actions. Predictability of the consequences of a course of action, as a prerequisite of choice, requires rational empirical knowledge and logical consistency. Choices are also dependent on norms and values, as well as on affective meanings, the balancing of which requires complex calculations of costs and advantages or utilities. Appreciation of rational knowledge implies – and depends upon – a commitment to norms of rationality. The limits of rationality are set by irrationality in the sense of deviance from normative standards, but also by non-rational and non-logical factors such as tradition, religion, or art. The work of Pareto is taken as an important reference point as it is acknowledged to be "the most ambitious attempt to achieve a generalized formulation of a total social system of rational action." (Eds.)

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-62377-1_4

Full citation:

Parsons, T. (2018)., An approach to the analysis of the role of rationality in social action, in H. Staubmann & V. Lidz (eds.), Rationality in the social sciences, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 53-57.

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