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(2018) Epistemic relativism and scepticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
This chapter frames Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism as meta-philosophical threats that rely on the same argument: the Agrippan trilemma. Philosophers have traditionally attempted to neutralize both threats by means of a common response to this argument. The chapter surveys a number of such responses before outlining a more promising, dialectical argument against epistemic relativism that has no anti-sceptical ambitions. In doing so, it elucidates the book's central claim that Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism are distinct threats that require different responses.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3_1
Full citation:
Bland, S. (2018). Introduction, in Epistemic relativism and scepticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-14.
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