Phänomenologie — Psychologie oder Ontologie?
The paper tries to show that Husserl de facto conceives phenomenology both as an eidetic psychology and as an eidetic ontology, then tries to account for such contradiction and to argue that this has to be solved by thinking phenomenology in an ontological sense, i.e. as a structural analysis of the world of experience or transcendental aesthetics, instead of in a psychological sense, i.e. as a structural analysis of really immanent occurences or introspection. In fact, the form of the world does not depend on the subjective apprehension of immanent elements, but on objective relationships among sensuous contents.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
De Palma, V. (2016). Phänomenologie — Psychologie oder Ontologie?. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 12 (8), pp. 1-28.
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