Habermas and the "presupposition" of the common objective world

Matheson Russell

pp. 171-203

Habermas asserts that the ‘presupposition’ of the common objective world is thrust upon us by the pragmatics of language use. However, this is a dubious claim. A pre-linguistic relation to the world as common and objective is required for language acquisition. What’s more, Husserl’s analyses indicate that aspects of our experience of the common world are grounded in experiences of spatio-temporal horizonality and of the co-presence of others within that world-horizon. This is not to negate the importance of communicatively achieved intersubjectivity, nor to diminish the rational significance of our linguistically articulated ‘world concepts’. But it is to suggest that the ‘presupposition’ of the common objective world has phenomenological, not linguistic-pragmatic, roots.

Publication details

DOI: 10.19079/metodo.5.1.171

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Russell, M. (2017). Habermas and the "presupposition" of the common objective world. Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 5 (1), pp. 171-203.

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