Phänomenologie und Realismus
Die Frage nach der Wirklichkeit im Streit zwischen Husserl und Ingarden
I deal with the relation between phenomenology and realism while examining Ingarden’s critique towards Husserl. I exhibit the empiricist nucleus of Husserl’s phenomenology, according to which the real is what can be sensuously experienced. On this basis, I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is not idealistic, in opposition to the realistic phenomenology, according to which reality consists in entities which cannot be sensuously experienced and are thus ideal. Finally I attempt to show that the idealistic elements of Husserl’s thinking do not originate from the transcendental turn, but from a remainder of psychologism that contradicts his empiricism.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
De Palma, V. (2017). Phänomenologie und Realismus: Die Frage nach der Wirklichkeit im Streit zwischen Husserl und Ingarden. Husserl Studies 33 (1), pp. 1-18.
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