Time-series of ephemeral impressions
the abhidharma-buddhist view of conscious experience
In the absence of continuing selves or persons, Buddhist philosophers are under pressure to provide a systematic account of phenomenological and other features of conscious experience. Any such Buddhist account of experience, however, faces further problems because of another cardinal tenet of Buddhist revisionary metaphysics: the doctrine of impermanence, which during the Abhidharma period is transformed into the doctrine of momentariness. Setting aside the problems that plague the Buddhist Abhidharma theory of experience because of lack of persons, I shall focus on problems that arise because of its allegiance to momentariness and explore some responses on behalf of the Abhidharma Buddhist philosophers. I address two challenges to the Buddhist view in this paper. The first, which I will call the "Phenomenological Challenge", primarily concerns the temporal properties of what is represented in conscious experience. The second, which I will call the "Metaphysical Challenge", concerns the temporal properties of conscious representation itself.
Chadha, M. (2015). Time-series of ephemeral impressions: the abhidharma-buddhist view of conscious experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3), pp. 543-560.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.