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(2007) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4).
Emotion theorists tend to separate "arousal" and other bodily events such as "actions" from the evaluative component of emotion known as "appraisal." This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called "enactive approach." I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective notion of personhood.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-007-9077-8
Full citation:
Colombetti, G. (2007). Enactive appraisal. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4), pp. 527-546.
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