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(2007) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3).
Husserl is well known for his critique of the "mathematizing tendencies" of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper I focus on a particular example of Husserl's "mathematized phenomenology": his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical systems theory.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-007-9052-4
Full citation:
Yoshimi, J. (2007). Mathematizing phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3), pp. 271-291.
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