Repository | Journal | Volume | Articles
(2007) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett's criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9032-0
Full citation:
Soldati, G. (2007). Subjectivity in heterophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2), pp. 89-98.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.