Affection and attention
on the phenomenology of becoming aware
Addressing the matter of attention from a phenomenological perspective as it bears on the problem of becoming aware, I draw on Edmund Husserl's analyses and distinctions that mark his "genetic" phenomenology. I describe several experiential levels of affective force and modes of attentiveness, ranging from what I call dispositional orientation and passive discernment to so-called higher levels of attentiveness in cognitive interest, judicative objectivation, and conceptualization. These modes of attentiveness can be understood as motivating a still more active mode of reflective attention, i.e., philosophical attentiveness, and to this extent, even it would be subject to varying influences of affection. What role, if any, does affection play in a peculiar kind of reflective attention that is phenomenological? I conclude by briefly considering phenomenological reflective attentiveness and its relation to affection.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Steinbock, A. (2004). Affection and attention: on the phenomenology of becoming aware. Continental Philosophy Review 37 (1), pp. 21-43.
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