Time, or the mediation of the now
on Dan Zahavi's "irrelational" account of self-temporalization
On Dan Zahavi's Husserlian account of the subject, the self-temporalization of subjectivity presupposes what he calls an "immediate impressional self-manifestation." It follows from this view that self-awareness is an inherent power of the one who will be subject, rather than a product of sociality introduced into life from without. In this paper, I argue against Zahavi's position by going over the development of Husserl's account of time-consciousness, examining the positions Husserl takes and the reasons that he comes to these positions. Once we reach Husserl's ultimate account, it becomes evident that Zahavi's position is untenable.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Coate, M. (2018). Time, or the mediation of the now: on Dan Zahavi's "irrelational" account of self-temporalization. Continental Philosophy Review 51 (4), pp. 565-591.
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