Das "Ich" als "Alibi der Wahrheit" bei Jacques Lacan

Zum Verhältnis von Cogito und Begehren in der Psychoanalyse

Rolf Kühn

In Lacan’s perspective, the cogito is unable to account for the separation between desire and language for the individual. The fundamental difference pertaining to the signifier (signifiant) makes it impossible for the enunciation (sum) to ever coincide with what is enunciated (sense). Therefore no final knowledge of self, being and reality (réel) is possible within the framework of the imaginary-symbolic life-world. This analysis, which is decisive for the therapeutic process, is then confronted with a radical-phenomenological critique that questions Lacan’s presuppositions about alterity from the perspective of a primal and transcendental life (Lebendigkeit), a confrontation that ought to bear fruit for the dialog between psychoanalysis and phenomenology.

Publication details

Full citation:

Kühn, R. (2018). Das "Ich" als "Alibi der Wahrheit" bei Jacques Lacan: Zum Verhältnis von Cogito und Begehren in der Psychoanalyse. Studia Phaenomenologica 18, pp. n/a.

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.