What is original in Merleau-Ponty's view of the phenomenological reduction?
Despite the recent increase of interest in the work of Merleau-Ponty there is still a persistent tendency to overlook the uniqueness of the philosophical position he advances in Phenomenology of Perception. In this article I present a reading of Merleau-Ponty's account of the phenomenological reduction that explains how it is original. I do this by contrasting his presentation of the reduction with that of the early Husserl, highlighting how his emphasis on the phenomenology of the "perceived world' leads him to reject Husserl's conception of phenomenology as a "philosophical science,' and the Kantian language in which the this account is framed. I go on to critically discuss the interpretations of the reduction advanced by Stephen Priest and Joel Smith as examples of readings that fail to fully grasp Merleau-Ponty's account of the "natural attitude' as resting on the inherent objectivizing structure that is built into perception itself. The way that these authors misinterpret Merleau-Ponty helps to make maximally clear the profound philosophical significance that he places on the phenomenology of the "perceived world'.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Pollard, C. (2018). What is original in Merleau-Ponty's view of the phenomenological reduction?. Human Studies 41 (3), pp. 395-413.
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