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Psychologism, logic, and phenomenology

Vladimir N. Bryushinkin

pp. 39-52

In the XXth century phenomenology developed a consistent and deep philosophy of logic. Husserl's Logical Investigations and Formal and Transcendental Logic were first stones laid in the foundation of phenomenological philosophy of logic. Anti-psychologism was the corner stone of the Husserl's philosophy of logic. After Husserl the idea was analyzed by many thinkers inside and outside of phenomenology. Psychologism and antipsychologism have usually been regarded as positions which provide ready answers to epistemological questions which may be evaluated as true or false. The basis for the evaluation was the rejection/adoption of the objectivity of logical laws, their independence of any cognitive agent. The experience of investigations into the problem, however, has shown that psychologism and antipsychologism are not true or false answers to a certain epistemological question, but more likely are research programmes. This understanding of the problem was proposed by Thomas Seebohm in series of articles. For example, in "Psychologism Revisited"1 Seebohm states that "psychologism" is the name of a research program. "The aim of the program was to solve all questions of epistemology, those referring to logic and mathematics included, with the aid of psychological research."2 This important understanding of psychologism as a research program opens a new perspective of investigation of the problem.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9446-2_3

Full citation:

Bryushinkin, V. N. (2000)., Psychologism, logic, and phenomenology, in O. K. Wiegand, R. J. Dostal, L. Embree, J. Kockelmans & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Phenomenology on Kant, German idealism, hermeneutics and logic, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 39-52.

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