Question, reflection, and philosophical method in Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures
Being and Time can be read as a treatise on transcendental method investigating the conditions of possibility for philosophical knowledge. As such, it finds its model in the transcendental-logical tradition, specifically in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason which "is a treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself."1 "Method" here does not denote a procedure which would be applicable indifferently to any subject-matter but rather the way in which a particular sort of subject-matter becomes scientifically accessible in the first place. In this sense, Heidegger's considerations of method in Being and Time are not limited to the sections explicitly so identified, but consist in the entire spiralling movement from everyday being-in-the-world to the authentic temporalizing of anticipatory resoluteness. The question of how philosophical inquiry is possible governs the general structure of the book, Heidegger's choice of phenomena to investigate, and the limits within which he pursues the investigation. Dasein's structure is articulated only so far as is necessary for understanding how philosophical knowledge of being is possible, that is, only so far as Dasein (like Kant's apriori synthesis) is to be seen as the transcendental condition for ontological knowledge.2 Anthropological interpretations of Being and Time—e.g., those that bemoan its one-sidedly gloomy picture of "man"—fail to appreciate the significance of these limits.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Crowell, S. (1999)., Question, reflection, and philosophical method in Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures, in B. C. Hopkins (ed.), Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 201-230.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.