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In Chapter Three of my study of Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality, I will be concerned with bringing into relief the phenomenally peculiar non-positing, but nevertheless "objectivating" intentionality of psychologically pure consciousness. Husserl's account of the "absolute being" of this intentionality is in my view importent for the following reason. The uncovering of this psychologically pure phenomenological residuum emerges in his analyses as the requisite for uncovering the horizonal intentionality of worldly apperception. I will try to show that it is the mundane efficacy of the non-actional intentionality of the latter which Husserl finds needs to be bracketed and suspended in order to effect the phenomenological reduction of psychologically pure consciousness to transcendentally pure consciousness. My discussion of the world phenomenon and its non-actional intentionality is intended then to prepare the way for the discussion, in Chapter Four, of precisely what it is in this state of affairs that leads him to formulate and execute the transcendental reduction.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5_4

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