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(2019) First philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer.

The accomplishment and problematic of a phenomenological-psychological reduction

Edmund Husserl

pp. 334-346

We now have to clarify everywhere in the same manner—if in this way the recollected (or anticipated) experience is only conscious for me as such by being conscious for me as such as perceived in a recollected past (or to be perceived in an anticipated future)—that a purely subjective content is contained in every such intentiona content, namely, the purely subjective [content] of this implied past perception or future perception. The phenomenological reduction with respect to a recollection or anticipation, thus, demands that I carry this reduction over into the recollected past or into the anticipated future. In other words, the phenomenological reduction.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-024-1597-1_19

Full citation:

Husserl, E. (2019). The accomplishment and problematic of a phenomenological-psychological reduction, in First philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 334-346.

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