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(2008) Introduction to logic and theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer.

The higher forms of objectification

Edmund Husserl

pp. 273-350

The last lectures afforded you a look into the original essence of time consciousness, whose full elucidation obviously constitutes one of the main foundations of all so-called theory of experience. The original essence of time consciousness is naturally revealed in the authentic intuition of time as we have it in every perception and, which is already implied in this, in every fresh memory directly following a perception. The latter is really in a certain way itself a perception, namely, the direct, impressional laying hold of past being, just as, on the other hand, perception at the same time in concreto implies fresh memory.Time consciousness is not always perception of time, not always primarily time constituting consciousness. We also have time consciousness in the form of simulative memory, of re-remembering, and something of the kind also in symbolic form and in the form of temporal judging, in short, in forms in which we do not have simply time givenness before us and lay a confirmatory finger on it, but often, and to a completely extraordinary degree, we determine time objectively and posit it as existing on the basis of indirect indications, on the basis of extraneous information, etc. For this, an imaginative simulation or a figurative presentation of what is referred to does not even need to be present. Obviously, all that also needs phenomenological elucidation. Needed is a phenomenology of the simulative memory and of its relation to primary memory, a phenomenology of the direct, purely intuitive, and of the indirect, sign-mediated evaluation of time, comparison of time and, in general, judgment of time. But, it would mean starting from the wrong end were one to want to begin there.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-6727-3_8

Full citation:

Husserl, E. (2008). The higher forms of objectification, in Introduction to logic and theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 273-350.

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