Sublating the free will problematic
powers, agency and causal determination
I argue that realism about causal powers (which, loosely following Brian Ellis, I refer to as "anti-passivism') sublates the passivist, Humean-inflected free will problematic. In the first part of the paper I show that adopting what I call "powers-non-determinism' reconfigures the conceptual terrain with respect to the causation component of the contemporary problematic. In part two I show how adopting "powers-non-determinism' significantly alters the nature of the discussion with respect to the agency component of the problematic. In part three I compare "powers-non-determinism' to an otherwise- Humean agent causal position.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Groff, R. (2019). Sublating the free will problematic: powers, agency and causal determination. Synthese 196 (1), pp. 179-200.
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