Repository | Journal | Volume | Articles

The main aim of this work is to evaluate whether Boolos' semantics for second-order languages is model-theoretically equivalent to standard model-theoretic semantics. Such an equivalence result is, actually, directly proved in the "Appendix". I argue that Boolos' intent in developing such a semantics is not to avoid set-theoretic notions in favor of pluralities. It is, rather, to prevent that predicates, in the sense of functions, refer to classes of classes. Boolos' formal semantics differs from a semantics of pluralities for Boolos' plural reading of second-order quantifiers, for the notion of plurality is much more general, not only of that set, but also of class. In fact, by showing that a plurality is equivalent to sub-sets of a power set, the notion of plurality comes to suffer a loss of generality. Despite of this equivalence result, I maintain that Boolos' formal semantics does not committ (directly) second-order languages (theories) to second-order entities (and to set theory), contrary to standard semantics. Further, such an equivalence result provides a rationale for many criticisms to Boolos' formal semantics, in particular those by Resnik and Parsons against its alleged ontological innocence and on its Platonistic presupposition. The key set-theoretic notion involved in the equivalence proof is that of many-valued function. But, first, I will provide a clarification of the philosophical context and theoretical grounds of the genesis of Boolos' formal semantics.

DOI: 10.1007/s10516-017-9360-4

Full citation: