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(2017) Axiomathes 27 (5).
This paper explores the thesis that de re quantification into propositional attitudes has been wrongly conceived. One must never bind an individual variable in the context of a propositional attitude. Such quantification fails to respect the quantificational scaffolding of discursive thinking. This is the lesson of the Meinong–Russell debate over whether there are objects of thought about which it is true to say they are not. Respecting it helps to see how to solve contingent Liar paradoxes of propositional attitudes such as Kripke's Nixon–Jones.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s10516-017-9350-6
Full citation:
Landini, G. (2017). Meinong and Russell: some lessons on quantification. Axiomathes 27 (5), pp. 455-474.
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