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123637

(1982) Husserl and intentionality, Dordrecht, Reidel.

Husserl's theory of noematic Sinn

David Woodruff Smith, David L Smith, Ronald McIntyre

pp. 153-226

This chapter continues our discussion of Husserl's theory of intentionality, focusing on his account of noema and noematic Sinn. We have already argued that, for Husserl, noemata are ideal "contents" of consciousness; specifically, the Sinn in the noema is the component of an act's content that determines the act's intentional relation to its object. Now we ask for more details: just what kind of entity is a Sinn and precisely how does it confer intentionality on the act?

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-9383-5_4

Full citation:

Smith, D.W. , Smith, D.L. , McIntyre, R. (1982). Husserl's theory of noematic Sinn, in Husserl and intentionality, Dordrecht, Reidel, pp. 153-226.

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