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There are two problems that arise as soon as one attempts to specify Merleau-Ponty's position on any of the standard problems or within any of the major problem areas of philosophy. The first of these is that his view on a particular issue or set of issues is almost never self-contained or self-sufficient, but depends on other parts of his general theory of human experience, not simply for the evidence of its correctness, but for its intelligibility as well. The second problem is that on almost any question, although it is quite easy to identify a number of answers which Merleau-Ponty takes to be clearly wrong, it is almost impossible to specify very clearly that answer which he takes to be correct. With these problems in mind, this essay will be divided into two main sections. In the first of these I will present enough of Merleau-Ponty's basic philosophical view to provide the needed background for a discussion of his philosophy of mind. In the second section I will take up a number of issues in the philosophy of mind, attempting not only to locate Merleau-Ponty vis-à-vis the alternatives he rejects, but also to give as clear an account as possible of the positive theory which is to replace them.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-6932-2_13

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