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In the previous chapter I made the argument that genuine science is a hobby which is not dependent upon universities to be pursued. However, what this argument did not necessarily address is the possibility that science, and play more generally, nevertheless involves some form of practical interest. This I call the "humanist challenge": as we have eminently practical interests that cannot be escaped, all "nonpractical interests" in fact contain implicit practical interests. As such genuine science understood as the pursuit of nonpractical knowledge has never been, nor can ever be, achieved. In order to counter this challenge and justify the possibility of genuine science this chapter will clarify the notions (plural) of objectivity. To do this I will explore the "humanist challenge" in the form of public sociology as instigated by Michael Burawoy. In order to show the nature of the humanist challenge I will then show how, despite its claims to be genuine science, naturalism is in fact humanist in the same way. This will reveal the problems in their understanding of objectivity based on treating science as an epistemically superior pursuit. Properly understood, genuine science is actually an epistemically inferior pursuit.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-92120-4_6

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