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(1988) Perspectives on mind, Dordrecht, Springer.
Consciousness is an embarrassment to functionalism and to the computational-representational theory of mind. Whatever the causal and/or computational role of a mental state, it seems that same function might be performed without consciousness. So functionalism or computationalism which would identify a mental state with its causal or computational role cannot account for consciousness. (Unless it can be shown that being conscious changes the causal or computational role of a mental state.) It would be convenient, then, for the functionalist or computationalist, if someone could show that consciousness does not exist.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_3
Full citation:
Smith, D.W. (1988)., Rey cogitans: the unquestionability of consciousness, in H. Otto & J. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on mind, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 25-34.
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