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12.1. Ricœur and the distinction between ethical goodness and moral normativity: how one does not imply the other—The intimacy of ethics contrasts with the publicity of morality—Acquiring moral norms and ethical principles: both work in a context-sensitive way—Ethical formality as empty: morality provides the content for an application of ethics—Actions are reflected in the world—The dispelling of epistemic vertigo: moral commitments as hinges—The question of deriving moral norms from ethical principles. 12.2 Rawls' contextualist "veil of ignorance" in political philosophy—A parallel thought experiment in morals: the disclosure principle (DP)—If nothing of what I did were concealed, would I care about it?—The Epicurean dilemma—Pragmatism and shame—Refusal of any sensible interferences with one's actions when it comes to moral responsibility. 12.3 The peculiarity of akratic actions—Doing w instead of r as resulting from a conflict of reasons, not from ignorance—Impossibility of knowing how to act—Our legitimations are of equal value. 12.4 Is there a randomness of practical justification?—Positive and negative ethical experiences: the satisfaction for having done r and the dissatisfaction for having done w—Applying DP to each case: peace and torment—The Socratic involuntariness of ignorant choices collides with the impracticality of moral knowledge—How DP goes along with the context-sensitivity of our rational decisions being itself context-sensitive—Recognizing the fluidity of r-w standards.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-00154-4_12

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