The background as intentional, conscious, and nonconceptual
The common understanding of intentionality and consciousness is still so dominated by thought and linguistic representation that even those who see that thought and language require a background of more basic know-how often conceive it as being pre-intentional, non-representational, and non-conscious. In this chapter, I want to argue that the background is non-conceptual rather than non-representational and non-conscious, and that it is conscious and intentional in the sense that background know-how essentially manifests itself in conscious and intentional episodes and performances, in perceptual and actional experiences with non-conceptual intentional content, in experiences of familiarity or surprise, or in the sense of being ready and knowing how to do things.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Schmitz, M. (2012)., The background as intentional, conscious, and nonconceptual, in Z. Radman (ed.), Knowing without thinking, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 57-82.
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