Truth, signification and paradox
Thomas Bradwardine's solution to the semantic paradoxes, presented in his Insolubilia written in Oxford in the early 1320s, turns on two main principles: that a proposition is true only if things are wholly as it signifies; and that signification is closed under consequence. After exploring the background in Walter Burley's account of the signification of propositions, I consider the extent to which Bradwardine's theory is compatible with the compositional principles of the distribution of truth over conjunction, disjunction, negation and the conditional.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Read, S. (2015)., Truth, signification and paradox, in T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the philosophy of truth, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 393-408.
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