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(2007) The other, Dordrecht, Springer.
Philosophical reflections on the concept of a person are mainly rooted in ethics and in ontology. In my paper I want to focus on the role of the body in some of these theories, especially in analytic philosophy. I want to show that there is a significant gap between ontological and ethical concepts of persons concerning the role of embodiment and body. In ontology, analytic philosophers stress the importance of an embodied concept of a person because the body is central in identifying and individuating persons. In contrast to mental entities like a Cartesian Ego, persons can be localized in time and space. In ethics, though, the concept of a person is characterized by mental ascriptions only. Following Kant and Locke, persons are regarded as moral unities to whom one can ascribe responsibility and rights. Recent ethical concepts of a person can be seen in this tradition. The moral character of a person is justified by pointing to consciousness, reason, memory and autonomy. Reflections on the role of the body can hardly be found. The embodiment of persons does not seem to be important in ethical reflections on the nature of persons.
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Full citation:
Reichold, A. (2007)., Embodiment and the ethical concept of a person, in H. Fielding, G. Hiltmann, D. Olkowski & A. Reichold (eds.), The other, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 169-185.
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