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Although developing from different aspects, the three parts of this chapter is motivated by the same thought: the classical definition of "rational animals' brings out a very strict and narrow notion of rationality. We are speaking animals, which not only can formulate a propositional attitude or make explicit assertion, but also manifest in our implicit exercise of perceptual attentions such as taking things as things, recognition, discrimination, and other pre-linguistic adoption in effective practice (Part I). In Part II, the author makes rational defense for desire: desire is no longer just the object of rational thinking to suppress; it can contribute to our deliberation and let the agent to be motivated by the right reason authentically and intrinsically. The hallmark of mature deliberator is to act on reason and his own purpose independently. In part III, the author demonstrates that this miraculous achievement of intellect, however, has its pre-history and infantile roots. Its acquisition depends on the fostering from mother and some other persons, and its improvement depends on the trust of other deliberators.

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-8651-9_5

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