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(2009) Late antique epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer.
Nous and Geist
self-identity and methodological solipsism in Plotinus and Hegel
Robert M. Rerchman
pp. 191-210
This study offers a parallel discussion of Plotinus' and Hegel's conceptions of Nous and Geist. Its overall aim is to show how these conceptions enable Plotinus and Hegel to construct a notion of self-identity in which the individual self or mind can be ultimately identified with a supra-personal identity or mind. To attain this goal, Plotinus and Hegel employ the presupposition of methodological solipsism not as a strategy that restricts the validity of certain metaphysical claims within a first-person standpoint, but as a strategy that makes possible the expansion of the first-person perspective into a collective one that includes other minds. Their aim is to overcome the dualistic and solipsistic tendencies that they saw in Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant.
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Full citation:
Rerchman, R. M. (2009)., Nous and Geist: self-identity and methodological solipsism in Plotinus and Hegel, in P. Vassilopoulou & S. R. L. Clark (eds.), Late antique epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 191-210.
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