The Wittgensteinian position
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein uses his theory of hinge commitments to attack Cartesian scepticism and Moorean realism. This chapter shows that it can also be used to leverage an argument for epistemic relativism that makes no use of the Agrippan trilemma. In addition, it examines Michael Williams' and Duncan Pritchard's anti-relativist interpretations of On Certainty. Williams reads Wittgenstein as offering a contextualist response to Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism, while Pritchard claims that Wittgenstein attacks these positions using a Davidsonian style of coherentism. The chapter concludes that these are two more unsuccessful anti-sceptical arguments against epistemic relativism.
Bland, S. (2018). The Wittgensteinian position, in Epistemic relativism and scepticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 145-173.
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