Sensibility and the otherness of the world

Levinas and Merleau-Ponty

Paula Lorelle

pp. 191-201

Sensibility has traditionally been defined as a relation with the world's exteriority. However, a certain post-husserlian phenomenology tends to reverse this definition and to redefine sensibility as an internal relation that takes place from within the world. This article focuses on this phenomenological concept of 'sensibility" in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty and intends to show that this concept rests upon the presupposition of an alternative according to which we would have whether a sensible experience of identity, or an acosmic experience of otherness—whether a wordly experience of the same or a worldless experience of otherness. Yet, by reducing sensibility to the experience of the world's interiority and rejecting otherness beyond any worldly experience, this conception fails to account for a significant dimension of sensibility—namely, sensibility as the experience of the world's own otherness, foreignness or exteriority. It is our hope that, from the critical exposition of this alternative, will eventually appear in conclusion the significant part of this forgotten dimension of sensibility.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11007-019-09461-0

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Lorelle, P. (2019). Sensibility and the otherness of the world: Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. Continental Philosophy Review 52 (2), pp. 191-201.

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