This chapter argues that contrary to its own self-image, the so-called "common sense" of the natural attitude is actually highly prejudicial. Far from being an unmediated direct intuition of "the facts' of, say, a hate incident, the natural attitude generates interpretations that are driven by a number of underlying presuppositions. These in effect "mediate" even the most apparently "immediate" intuition of seemingly "objective facts' and "factual patterns' of hate crime. As a result, the natural attitude's objectivism encourages distinctly positivist quantitative forms of hate crime research. At this stage, we leave open the question of whether its mediation by far from objective presuppositions tends to contradict and undermine such positivism; and if so, do the difficulties created in this way tend to point the way forward to a diametrically opposite radically qualitative approach of Husserl?
Salter, M. , McGuire, K. (2020). Superimposing a problematic objectivism, in The lived experience of hate crime, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 53-88.
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