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(2004) Synthese 138 (2).
Evidence is drawn together to connect sources of inconsistency that Frege discerned in his foundations for arithmetic with the origins of the paradox derived by Russell in Basic Laws I and then with antinomies, paradoxes, contradictions, riddles associated with modal and intensional logics. Examined are: Frege's efforts to grasp logical objects; the philosophical arguments that compelled Russell to adopt a description theory of names and a eliminative theory of descriptions; the resurfacing of issues surrounding reference, descriptions, identity, substitutivity, paradox in the debates concerning modal and intensional logics; the development of the New Theory of Reference. I consider this to be the philosophical ground upon which the debates regarding that theory should take place.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1023/B:SYNT.0000013241.59493.1d
Full citation:
Ortiz Hill, C. (2004). Reference and paradox. Synthese 138 (2), pp. 207-232.
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