Collective affective intentionality and phenomenology of togetherness
In this paper, I seek to challenge some contemporary accounts of collective affective intentionality by arguing for irreducibility of ontological autonomy of individual affective experiences. By elaborating on several requirements for reciprocal affective responses, I propose that instead of endorsing tendency of experiential unification, phenomenal fusion and token identity accounts and conceiving of single body of collectivity in terms of extended self, as the ontological bearer of affective intentionality, one has to maintain at least minimal asymmetry of self and other. Moreover, I discuss the role of embodied interaffectivity and mutual incorporation accounts for collective affective experiences.
Matiashvili, L. (2022). Collective affective intentionality and phenomenology of togetherness. Meta 14 (2), pp. 330-351.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.