Calendar | Conference

The True, the Valid and the Normative

Milano, 20 - 22 September 2022

CFP is open

The True, the Valid and the Normative

San Raffaele School of Philosophy 2022

Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan

Faculty of Philosophy

Palazzo Arese-Borromeo – Cesano Maderno

 

Accepted papers will be published in a Special Issue of Phenomenology and Mind.

 

Invited speakers (further invited speakers to be confirmed)

Pedro Alves (University of Lisbon)

Roberta De Monticelli (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)

Pascal Richard (University of Toulon)

Wojciech Żełaniec (University of Gdańsk)

 

Call for papers

The inquiry into the concepts of true and false has generally privileged, in contemporary philosophy, apophantic truth, that is, the truth of dicta (sentences, propositions, statements, or utterances). However, the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ seem to also apply to other entities apart from dicta. Amedeo Giovanni Conte, among others, brought back attention to the not infrequent cases where we speak of the truth and falsity of res, of things. In what sense, for instance, can we speak of true gold, a true diamond, a true warrior, or the true Kant? And in what sense can we speak of false gold, a false diamond, a false name, a false will, or a false banknote? Further, can we argue that a true warrior ought to be brave? The answer to such questions seems to imply the distinction introduced by Conte (2016) between two species of truth: de dicto, or semantic truth, which specifically pertains to a dictum qua dictum, and de re, or ontological truth, which generally pertains to a res qua res, to a thing qua thing. What are the relations between the two species of truth? What do they have in common, and in what do they differ?

The introduction of the distinction between de re and de dicto truth into the debate on normativity and related issues discloses new perspectives that participants in this School are invited to explore. What is at stake are, on the one hand, the nature and scope of de dicto truth and de re truth respectively, along with their relations to one another; on the other hand, the possible impact of these two notions on the investigations on normativity and its sources, as well as on the notions of validity and effectiveness of norms.

When considering the issue of the scope of de dicto truth, one may ask whether de dicto truth is to be predicated exclusively of apophantic sentences or constative utterances (Austin 1950; 1962), or whether it can be predicated also of anapophantic sentences, such as performative sentences—which appear to be self-verifying. Given that a similar form of self-verification seems to be implied also in prescriptive sentences, what kind of facts, or states-of-affairs are brought about by such sentences? Is it possible to speak of “deontic states-of-affairs” (Conte 1970; 2006; see also Sbisà 2014 on deontic states and deontic objects)? What would be the implications for the investigation of the relations between truth and validity of norms? Notably, can the validity of norms—at least when norms are understood as prescriptive sentences—be conceived as a form of de dicto truth, that is, as the correspondence to a deontic reality? Is such a deontic reality to be understood exclusively as a product of prescriptive sentences, or is it also possible to conceive a pre-existent deontic reality? What would be the implications as to the possibility of applying logic to norms?

When considering the notion of de re truth, on the other hand, what can be its implications for the philosophy of the normative? Notably, is there a relation between de re truth and the normative and axiological dimensions of reality?

The fact that we call invalid banknotes “false” banknotes suggests, for instance, that at least in the domain of institutional phenomena the de re truth or falsity of an entity is directly linked to and conditioned by the very norms or constitutive rules that determine the validity conditions of that entity. Should we speak here of a “normative truth of things”? Can it be argued, conversely, that in other circumstances specific oughts or norms can be derived from the de re truth of an entity—like when we say that a true warrior ought to be brave, as suggested by Edmund Husserl (1900-1901)? Is this a further kind of normative truth of things? How does the concept of de re truth relate to the notion of “eidetic legality”? Can it be fruitful for the determination of the bonds and constraints that phenomena lay upon thought, language, action, and reality?

Warrior is also a good example of what scholars have recently called ‘dual character concepts’—concepts that encode both a descriptive dimension and an independent normative dimension for categorization (Knobe, Prasada, & Newman 2013; Leslie 2015; Reuter 2019). When is a person appropriately categorised as a true warrior? Can the notion of de re truth help us illuminate the normative dimension of dual character concepts?

A final aspect of the investigation of the relations between truth and normativity concerns the controversial notion of the effectiveness of norms. Some legal philosophers maintain that the existence of norms should be identified with their effectiveness within a social group, and that consequently an ineffective norm is not a de re true norm. Others suggest that satisfaction, or fulfilment, rather than validity, should be considered as the deontic análogon of de dicto truth in the logic of imperatives and norms. Both these perspectives, however, arouse the following question: are all norms capable of being fulfilled? For instance, a norm establishing that one’s legal capacity begins with birth does not seem to be fulfillable at all, since it does not prescribe any behaviour. Furthermore, does the fulfilment of a norm exhaust the possible ways in which a norm affects an agent’s behaviour? For instance, if we consider a poker cheater, aren’t the rules of poker, despite not being fulfilled, still operating and impacting on her/his behaviour when s/he hides an ace up his sleeve—as suggested by the notion of “nomotropic behaviour” introduced by Conte (2000; 2016)? How does the phenomenon of nomotropic behaviour relate to the notions of both de dicto and de re truth of norms?

 

Section 1. Truth of language vs. truth of things

        The truth of linguistic entities vs the truth of non-linguistic entities: what do de dicto (semantic) and de re (ontological) truth have in common? How do they differ?

        In what sense can an object (a res) be true? In what sense can it be false?

        What is the difference between ‘a true professor’ and ‘the true professor’? Can we speak of de re truth both in relation to the correspondence to an eîdos and the correspondence to an ídion?

        Are there true questions and true lies?

        What are the relations between the de dicto and de re truth (or falsity) of linguistic entities? Can the de dicto truth (or falsity) of a linguistic entity condition, or be conditioned, by its de re truth (or falsity)?

        Does the notion of de dicto truth boil down to apophantic truth, or anapophantic dicta can be de dicto true, too—as the self-verification of performatives suggests?

Section 2. Truth and validity

        Can de dicto (semantic) truth be predicated of norms? Do prescriptive sentences self-verify?

        Is there a deontic reality to which norms may truly correspond?

        Is the validity of norms the logical deontic análogon of the de dicto truth of apophantic propositions?

        Can the deontic validity of a norm be derived from the logical validity of an inference?

        In what sense the de re truth of an institutional entity may depend upon the rules or norms on its validity?

        Is an invalid norm still a de re true norm? What is the relation between de re truth, validity and existence of norms?

Section 3. Truth and the normative and axiological dimensions of reality

        What are the normative implications of de re truth?

        Can an ought be derived from the ontological truth of an entity?

        Is a true x a good x? Is ‘true’ an evaluative predicate?

        Can the notion of de re truth be fruitful for the investigation of dual character concepts?

        In what sense a token is a true or a false token of a type? In what sense a type is the true type of a class of tokens?

        What are the ontological conditions of the de re truth of an entity?

        How does the concept of de re truth relate to the notion of “eidetic legality” and to the bonds and constraints that phenomena lay upon thought, language, action, and reality?

Section 4. Truth and validity in action: norm effectiveness and nomotropic behaviour

        What are the relations between de re truth, validity and effectiveness of norms? Is an ineffective norm still a valid and de re true norm?

        Is the satisfaction or fulfilment of a norm the deontic análogon of the de dicto truth of propositions?

        Can a norm be verified by action?

        Does the effectiveness of norms boil down to fulfilment?

        Are there true norms that are incapable of being fulfilled?

        In what sense the behaviour of a thief or a cheater is still a “nomotropic behaviour”?

The School will also host a special section devoted to the presentation of the results of CoRC (Covid Rules and Compliance). The project aimed at investigating the motivations for the violation and compliance of the norms Italian institutions enforced during the Covid-19 pandemic. The project, funded by MUR (code: FISR2020IP_04500), is an interesting case study for many of the issues the other sections of the School will focus on. 

 

Submissions must be prepared for double-blind review. Manuscripts – in .doc format – should not contain any identifying information and they cannot exceed 4000 words (references included). Manuscripts must be written in English. Moreover, they must contain:

-        an abstract of no more than 150 words;

-        the indication of the section to which the author(s) wants to contribute;

-        4/5 keywords.

 

For stylistic details, see:

http://www.rosenbergesellier.it/eng/journals/phenomenology-and-mind/editorial-norms

 

Submissions should be sent via the Phenomenology and Mind website by May 31st, 2022.

Authors should register here and then log in to submit their paper. Please, make sure to submit your paper to the section “The True, the Valid and the Normative”.

 

For further information, please contact Paolo Di Lucia (paolo.dilucia@unimi.it) and/or Lorenzo Passerini Glazel (lorenzo.passerini@unimib.it).

 

Important dates:

Deadline for submissions: May 31st, 2022.

Notification of acceptance: July 31st, 2022.

San Raffaele School of Philosophy: September 20th–22nd, 2022.

Publication of the special issue (expected): June 2023

 

Scientific Direction:

Paolo Di Lucia (University of Milan), Edoardo Fittipaldi (University of Milan), Lorenzo Passerini Glazel (University of Milano-Bicocca), Giuseppe Lorini (University of Cagliari), Laura Caponetto (University of Cambridge, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University), Vincenzo Costa (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University), Francesca De Vecchi (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University), Marco Di Feo (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University), Francesca Forlè (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University), Roberta Sala (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University), Sarah Songhorian (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University).