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(2005) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3).
According to Bickle, certain empirical results demonstrate that the bottom-up reduction of phychological concepts to the concepts of neuroscience has already been accomplished. I argue that this conclusion is hasty. Bickle claims that all high-level investigations depend on a mistake. I argue that this overstates the explanatory character of neuroscientific findings. Bickle's assessment is highly optimistic, but he is far from making a decisive argument. Those who wait for a full-blown reductionism will have to wait a little longer.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-005-4071-5
Full citation:
Gottschling, V. (2005). The mind reduced to molecules?. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3), pp. 279-283.
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