(2015) Horizons of authenticity in phenomenology, existentialism, and moral psychology, Dordrecht, Springer.
Phenomenology of value and the value of phenomenology
One of the hallmarks of the tradition of existential phenomenology is the primacy given to the perspective of the personal subject and the careful attention paid to the fundamental questions that arise from this perspective. Rather than accepting a place as servant to the natural sciences, existentialist philosophers have continually urged that the naturalistic viewpoint of these sciences cannot capture the full range of concerns confronting the individual in her personal existence. Charles Guignon, particularly in his studies of Heidegger, has emphasized this point, and has long championed orientation of the existentialist tradition as a valuable corrective to the prevailing philosophical naturalism. Guignon's work reminds us that we can look outside of the dominant naturalism to find a philosophical tradition that responds more deeply to the question of how to live a meaningful life.My aim in this essay is to build on this valuable contribution by considering Edmund Husserl's discussions of the meaning of life. While universally recognized as an important influence on the existentialist tradition in twentieth-century philosophy, Husserl's own engagement with the question of the meaning of life has received little discussion. This neglect comes despite the fact that Husserl's criticisms of naturalism influenced generations of thinkers in the existentialist tradition, including Heidegger, whose criticisms of the technological age can be seen as continuous in many ways with Husserl's earlier concerns.
Crowe, B. (2015)., Phenomenology of value and the value of phenomenology, in H. Pedersen & M. Altman (eds.), Horizons of authenticity in phenomenology, existentialism, and moral psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 95-108.
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