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(1996) Issues in Husserl's Ideas II, Dordrecht, Springer.

Perception and its causes

Gail Soffer

pp. 37-56

According to received opinion, causal and intentional theories of perception are opposed and even incompatible. From which one might expect that Husserlian phenomenology—as the intentional theory of mind par excellence—would also be causality's harshest critic. Indeed, support for this view can be found throughout Husserl's writings, from the early descriptive phenomenology, and its "bracketing" of causal questions along the lines of the Brentanoian distinction between descriptive and explanatory psychology; to the later transcendental phenomenology, with its notorious class="EmphasisTypeItalic ">Weltvernichtung and claim that absolute consciousness is neither causally related to nor causally dependent upon anything in the world.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8628-3_3

Full citation:

Soffer, G. (1996)., Perception and its causes, in T. Nenon & L. Embree (eds.), Issues in Husserl's Ideas II, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 37-56.

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