The self-conciousness in self-activity
Although Sartre's and Husserl's accounts differ on the exact relation of the self to consciousness, they seem to agree that the ego in important ways transcends intentional acts. If we may speak metaphorically here we can picture the possible relations of the self to consciousness on the following spatial model: the self may be "before," "behind," or "in" intentional acts. Sartre stresses the sense in which we are before acts that are themselves anonymous. Husserl stresses the sense in which we are behind our acts as a center from which they emanate. I do not wish to take a position on either of these views as a whole. Rather, I shall attempt in what follows to make explicit a third relation of the self to consciousness, the sense in which we do not transcend consciousness because we are living in our acts. I shall understand "acts" in a broad sense in which walking, gesturing, and laughing are acts. My aim shall be to point out the unique type of consciousness of self that is present in action. Though this project is descriptive it has certain theoretical consequences that will be sketched.
Stone, R. V. (1973)., The self-conciousness in self-activity, in D. Carr & E. Casey (eds.), Explorations in phenomenology, Den Haag, Nijhoff, pp. 253-260.
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