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(2017) The language of thought in late medieval philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer.
Many scholars have argued that Ockham changes his mind on the nature of mental syncategoremata when he moves from his early to his late theory of concepts. If, in the first theory (the so-called fictum theory), Ockham describes mental syncategoremata as linguistic concepts that are abstracted from spoken language, in the second theory (the so-called actus theory), he describes them as signs of the mind, naturally co-signifying the same things that the mental categoremata to which they apply naturally signify. In this essay, I want to give some arguments to prove that while Ockham indisputably modifies his position on the nature of concepts, he does not depart from his early explanation of the formation and function of mental syncategoremata. I shall focus especially on his Quodlibet IV, q. 35, which dates to a later period of his career. It is a significant text, for in it Ockham reaffirms the view he established in the early Ordinatio.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-66634-1_10
Full citation:
Amerini, F. (2017)., Ockham on mental syncategoremata, in J. Pelletier & M. Roques (eds.), The language of thought in late medieval philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 149-166.
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