This paper is mainly concerned with the analysis of some aspects of the specific/non-specific contrast. It also contains some remarks on the de dicto/de re ambiguity in belief contexts. The basic assumption underlying our analysis is that an adequate theory of meaning for a language should consist of (at least) a semantic theory and a pragmatic theory. A semantic theory we consider to be a theory of truth and a pragmatic theory a theory of correctness. One of the grounds for adopting this assumption is that there are aspects of the meaning of certain expressions and constructions which cannot be captured in terms of truth conditions, but which should be described in terms of the conditions under which these expressions and constructions can be used correctly.1 An important and interesting part of these conditions are those which concern the information of language users. That part of a pragmatic theory which deals with these conditions we call "epistemic pragmatics'.
Groenendijk, J. , Stokhof, M. (1981)., A pragmatic analysis of specificity, in F. Heny (ed.), Ambiguities in intensional contexts, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 153-190.
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