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Ryall presents an analysis of the contrasting philosophical presuppositions of the Kantian and Copernican world-views—ones which are, indeed, "worlds apart." Kant maintains that "experience" and "objectivity" are "the same thing" (B xvii), although if that is the case then everything we experience ought to be objective. This, however, is emphatically not the case, implying that we can observe ourselves—as physical beings—revolve with the earth as it encircles the sun. Given the impossibility of this—something which would require that we occupy two different places at the same time in perceiving our motion through space—an alternative account regarding our empirical cognitions must be sought. In developing this account the concepts of the "metaphenomenon" and of "consequential" rather than "corresponding" representations are introduced.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-56771-6_2

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