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(2016) Philosophy of mind and phenomenology, London-New York, Routledge.

For-me-ness

What it is and what it is not

Dan Zahavi, Uriah Kriegel

Publication details

Full citation:

Zahavi, D. , Kriegel, U. (2016)., For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not, in D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology, London-New York, Routledge, pp. n/a.

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