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(2007) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3).
Reflexive monism versus complementarism
an analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of max Velmans's reflexive model of consciousness
Hans-Ulrich Hoche
pp. 389-409
From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic "phenomenon' in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans's reflexive model with a complementaristic approach in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans's ontological monism and his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical causation.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9045-8
Full citation:
Hoche, H.-U. (2007). Reflexive monism versus complementarism: an analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of max Velmans's reflexive model of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3), pp. 389-409.
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